

CANADIAN WAR MUSEUM

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

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INTERVIEWEE: Alain R. Forand

INTERVIEWER: Andrew Burtch

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Transcription of Interview Number 31D 9 FORAND

Major-General Alain R. Forand (retd)

Interviewed 15 February 2008

By Andrew Burtch

INTERVIEWER: Canadian War Museum Oral History Project interview with Major General Alain Forand, retired, in Ottawa, Ontario on 15 February 2008. Interview begins.

FORAND: 1, 2, 3 1,2,3 checking.

INTERVIEWER: 1,2,3 test 1,2,3.

INTERVIEWER: Could you spell your name for the record?

FORAND: Alain Forand [spells name]

INTERVIEWER: We have both read and signed the release form?

FORAND: Yes, we did.

INTERVIEWER: OK.

Mr. Forand could tell me little bit about your selection and being dispatched to Cyprus and your first roles when you arrived in March was it? In 1974?

FORAND: The [Army?] regiment we had been told that we would initially be going to the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War, the Yom Kippur of 73 so we went to the Mojave Desert in California to train. We spent about a month there training in desert conditions. When we came back we found out there was a veto at the security consol I think by the Russians that did not want to see us there.

For compensation we were told that we would be on the next rotation to Cyprus starting in March and that we would be back in Canada in the beginning of October. So they had to select because the organization that the Canadians were providing in Cyprus were not that big. It was only 500 some odd people. First commander was selected with some members from the organization [?], the Support Company these type of people to compliment first commander.

So we left about the beginning-- we started to move to Cyprus about the beginning of March and I was given the task of the reconnaissance platoon, which was the biggest organization. I think I had about 56 people. It was a mix of [?] with a lot of experience,

young [?] but mostly young soldiers 18, 19 and 20, which the few weeks created a bit of a problem. I wouldn't say major problem but problem because they were young. They were restless. We were responsible as the recce platoon to the patrol the Green Line, what was called the Green Line and some other tasks that we were given by the commanding officer who was Lieutenant Colonel Doug Manuel but not sufficiently to occupy my guys.

I had also had been given the responsibility in case there were problems to man 450 calibre, six mortar, 81mm mortar and correction 650 calibre and four 106 recoilless rifle. So when I verified the states of these weapons and found out to my dismay that some of them were not functioning. Luckily within a period relatively short we were able to get the missing equipment from Germany. They were made ready and I started courses to keep my soldiers occupied and at the same time qualified them. That went extremely well. I was able to get a bit of get up on them and keep them occupied. It was more interesting also for them. We were mixing work and training. So everything went very well.

My headquarters, my command post was right on the middle of Green Line. We had a location where I could house all of my platoon. That was great for us. I had a couple of guys that were extremely good at [?] in the group and I gave them the task to organize our platoon house. If I could call it like that and the guys did a fantastic job. It took them couple of months to paint, to completely refurbish and reorganize and the sad part is we just completed it and we enjoyed it for about a week then the trouble started with the invasion. While first with the [Sampson?] coup and Makarios and after that the Turkish invasion. We enjoyed it for about a week.

Since we were right in the middle of things we were obliged to evacuate after three days after the invasion because I had received a couple of wounded and we could not really function. The Line of Separation there was only a few metres between the Turk and the Greek and we were right in the middle. So we had to evacuate that place and go to the camp at Nicosia near the, near the hotel there...

INTERVIEWER: Ummmm [Kronborg?]

FORAND: No not Kronborg...

INTERVIEWER: Blue Beret Camp?

FORAND: No, Blue Beret Camp was outside of Nicosia. Oh my God it was...let me think... what was the name? [Pause] The name I was looking for was Wolesley Barracks. So we were obliged to move the whole organization to Wolesley Barracks initially.

INTERVIEWER: OK. Since your men were patrolling the Green Line they were not at any point manning any of the Observation Posts?

FORAND: We had no responsibility at Observation Post. Us our responsibility was to patrol the Green Line to ensure there was no new construction. That was there was no problem arising out of the closeness in certain areas. There was less than two meters between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. So our job was to ensure that-- because one of the trick of both side was to add a couple of sand bags so they would improve the condition of their Observation Post or defensive position whatever they may call. So our job was to ensure that none of these were happening and also to get to know the villagers if I could call it like that as we patrol. So I had a morning patrol and afternoon patrol. Sometimes some night patrol but we were careful not to do to many of those because sometime it was a little bit dicey because there is no light in a lot of area and we could not be recognized so we could have been by one side or the other as an intrusion from one side to the other side.

INTERVIEWER: Were they bicycle, foot or...

FORAND: It was a mixture of foot and bicycle.

INTERVIEWER: Foot and bicycle.

FORAND: I remember that we were accused by some of the infantry platoon of stealing their vehicle, which never happened.

INTERVIEWER: Could you describe Maple Leaf Manor for me? This was [?]...

FORAND: Maple Leaf Manor was my platoon position. It was in the old, what they called the old Nicosia City not very far from the entrance. I would say maybe 300 to 400 metres. It had a common room or une salle or whatever une salle--

INTERVIEWER: A lobby?

FORAND: A lobby, major lobby which we turned into a bar. As an I was mentioning with the help some of my soldiers who had some very good capability as a woodworkers or as artist we really did quite a lovely place to sit. We had also rooms that were adjacent to that location and mostly we had in places I was the lucky one. I was alone in my room but everybody else had two or three or four people per room. So we had to have a lot of discipline to make sure it was always kept neatly. We were right in the between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot.

INTERVIEWER: Your daily routine before July was fairly uneventful?

FORAND: Not very-- almost nothing happened you know except somebody was trying to add sandbags to their defensive positions, some firing once in a while. Not against each other but in the air. Some complaint from one side against the other of perceive round or things they felt was not respecting the agreement what is in place. It was mostly small things. I did not have any major problems that arise. Like I was mentioning my biggest

worry was to ensure my guys did not create problems because they were young and I had to keep them occupied to make sure that they would stay within the expected bounds.

INTERVIEWER: OK. So move forward to July 15th then there the coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia and what happened next? What were platoons responsibilities at that time?

FORAND: When the coup happened I was in the hospital at Lanarca the British hospital because of a bug that I had caught. They had sent me to the hospital and I spent a week there and the day after the coup I was-- I wanted to get out of the hospital so my driver who had the same name as me Forand who was a hell of a soldier came and got me. At the same time just as he arrived there was also a helicopter that was sent by Colonel Manuel because there were some other Canadians that were also leaving the hospital so I came back by helicopter instead of with my driver.

Our main job during that period until the Turkish invasion itself was mostly to patrol the Green Line but also to go into villages because there were certain villages, that were Turkish villages, that were surrounded by Greek Cypriot and there were some problems that we were hearing that were arising. Plus there were factions those there were supporting the Makarios and those that were supporting the [Sampson?] We were trying to calm the situation. So I did a lot of patrols in vehicle during those days to try to assess the situation and pass the information back to my headquarter so that they could pass it onto the UN, UNFICYP Headquarters so we could pressure on both. The Turk and Greek authority to try to calm down things. We still carried on with our patrols. Obviously it was a little bit more activity because there was infighting amongst the Greek. There was a lot of settling of old score that I think was taking place.

There was funny situation I remember one day starting to go on patrol to the [?] Gate and to go [?] one of the small villages between Nicosia and Famagusta. There was a group of policeman that were supporting Makarios that had taken refuge in police headquarters near the Line, The Green Line and there was the other group that was supporting [Sampson?] and they had an old tank. I think it was a T34 and they fired two shots and they missed the building with the two shots. It was a little bit funny but it scared the people that were inside, the police and they surrendered. There was not much we could do because even though we were trying to calm the situation it was not part of our mandate. Our mandate was to ensure that the agreement between the Greek and Turk were maintained. But obviously it was creating a lot of tension on the Turkish side because there was lot of firing and mostly firing in the air and all these stupid things that happened. There was a lot of agitation on the Greek side because obviously there was a lot of people that were still taking President Makarios. There was group that almost believed themselves a [?] that were supporting [Sampson?]. The Military, the Greek Military seemed to be in favor supporting [Sampson?]. So it was creating quite a lot of tension amongst the Greek Cypriot population.

INTERVIEWER: But the Turk Cypriots at that time were relatively lying low? Did you get that impression?

FORAND: Oh yes for them but they didn't like because for them they were afraid it may go overboard and affect them. As I was saying there was small [enclave?] where they were surrounded by Greek where they were a little but afraid what may be happening if there was some over bounds from the Greek Cypriots. We were trying to [alleviate?] those fears but the only thing we had was a very small weapon and especially we did not have the authority to do anything about it.

INTERVIEWER: Just FMs, SMGs?

FORAND: We had FM and in my case it was a pistol and we had the old SMGs in those days. I mean it's not with that you are going to instill fear [chuckles] in people.

INTERVIEWER: Did you receive any advance notification or any sort of advance warning that there was going to be an invasion?

FORAND: There was some discussion that there would be an invasion because there was some threat that were made at that time by Turkey in the sense that Turkey was saying, "Our people, the Turkish Cypriot, better not get wounded or these types of things and we want to protect them."

So we had an inkling that maybe something may be happening but I don't think nobody much thought there would be a full-scale invasion. It could have been show of arms and all that-- The morning I don't exactly remember the date but I was at the headquarters and somebody said, "Look there are some parachutes coming out of the sky."

We went outside and there was in the Turkish enclave. There was a jump by paratroopers and then the [artillery?] falling and then the [Fast Air?] were coming in so we found out that we were in between and all hell broke loose at that time because firing on both sides. There was a lot of ammo expenditure. Not always in the right place. Sometime it was funny because you went to a defensive position where the guy had his [GPMG?] on the parapet and he was firing and you ask him where the hell are you firing? To him he had been told to fire so he was firing...

INTERVIEWER: But head down?

FORAND: Head down so he wasn't exactly looking where he was firing.

INTERVIEWER: Between the 15th and 20th of July the interim period did recce platoon suffer any wounded?

FORAND: I had initially when the Turkish invasion begin I was still located in the Maple Leaf Manor on The Green Line. We were still doing patrol because we were told carry on

with your patrol. We were going on a patrol and we were shouting to both sides [with a [?]], “Don’t shoot, this is a UN patrol, don’t shoot!” Well we became the target. If I remember in all I had two guys wounded and then I had another one and that’s when I was given the order by the...

The two guys that were initially wounded one was I think her was private at that time, Private Gasse and Private [Gingras?]. Gasse was wounded I think in his leg. His knee or something like that. So those were the first two wounded that we had and they happened on that same patrol. [Gingras?] as he was trying to help Gasse come out I think he was wounded only on the arm. It was rifle one that he received not a mortar. The other guy I don’t remember exactly but we had another one. Then we were told by our Colonel, Colonel Manuel to evacuate Maple Leaf Manor and to move all of my platoon into Wolesley Barracks, which we did.

INTERVIEWER: No incident on the way from Male Leaf Manor to Wolesley Barracks?

FORAND: No because the whole platoon there so they were a little bit more polite to us I suppose.

INTERVIEWER: OK. Your Wolesley Barracks came under attack as well during that time did it not?

FORAND: Yes there was a couple of rounds of 81mm mortar that fell within the Wolesley Barracks and there was one hit our service support company, which burned down. So there was not much we could do to put the fire out. But aside from that, aside from the mortar shell there was some firing over the camp but I don’t remember that anybody-- if there was some wounded on that mortar attack it was not very dangerous. It was light, light...

INTERVIEWER: Non-life threatening?

FORAND: No not life threatening, no.

Mostly when we came to Wolesley Barrack there was no more tasks for recce platoon because we were on foot and we did not have the equipment to do any type of patrolling so my organization was split. I lost the majority of my people, which were provided to other tasks that has to be done.

I don’t remember exactly when it happened but one day I remember that the service company were received some mortar bombs and burned to the ground. At one point and I think it was three or four days after the invasion had begin they were still some civilian in the Ledra Palace which was about 300 metres from Wolesley Barrack just like the rest of the road we were located. Colonel Manuel decided to go to the Ledra Palace to say to say to the civilian that were there and I’m providing you the opportunity to escort you out of this location and you people better cease it because after that I will feel that I will no

longer be responsible for your safety. So I decided-- Colonel Manuel went with three or four guys to accompany him I took a rifle from one of the corporals that were at the gate and I went with them and we went to the Ledra Palace. I was sort of the guy providing security because I had the [C1?] in my arm. There was a couple of shots fired but I don't think it was at us because it passed maybe 10 feet over our head but we could hear the ping arriving at the hotel.

The hotel after quite a bit of argument Lieutenant Colonel Manuel was able to convince the civilian to get out. So we got all the civilian out and there was no incident. No shooting when they came out. They left to Wolesley Barracks and then I received the order from Colonel Manuel to occupy Ledra Palace with about seven or eight guys. We stayed there until maybe two days, two, three days I don't remember exactly. But at one point the Turk thought because we were on the roof looking at the action and passing the information back to our headquarters so the Turk said, well you are passing the information to the Greek and we will bombard the Ledra Palace. So I was told to secure myself and my people so went in the basement after a couple of hours nothing happened so we were ordered to evacuate the Ledra Palace.

INTERVIEWER: Did you return at any point to the Ledra Palace?

FORAND: Well we returned after all the trouble were finished because that's where we were housed the majority of the regiment.

INTERVIEWER: OK. Can you tell me a bit of the-- what was the condition of the Ledra Palace after being [[?] power] after a couple of days?

FORAND: It was terrible. I mean all the food you know the smell was really terrible. It was like you go into a place that has not been cleaned for the last two or three years. There was a swimming pool and in the swimming pool there was a couple of bombs that has not exploded. So once we decided to occupy the Ledra Palace and that was after the trouble were completed and even after the second phase we had to clean up the whole place. To go into the refrigerator, the huge refrigerator, the guys has to have gas masks but that was almost six or seven weeks there had been no power and everything had been there was rotted. We had to clean the pool. So it took us about a week I think before we were able to occupy the Ledra Palace and provide sleeping quarters for the majority of the regiment.

INTERVIEWER: A lot of the-- you had to--with those six or seven guys in the first you incident had to clear the hotel floor by floor didn't you?

FORAND: We went through and made sure that nobody was there. So that was easy to do in the sense that you do one floor, you leave somebody, you go to the other floor you leave somebody and eventually you complete the whole-- and there was nobody left there. We did the whole hotel. Like I said I think we stayed two or three days there before we

were forced out of the location but we had our C-rations so we didn't use the facilities that were there.

INTERVIEWER: During those first couple of days did you use it as an Observation Post?

FORAND: Yes, the Ledra Palace is the highest building in that particular area and from there you see on the plain which used to be the Turkish Enclave. You could see from there up to the airport. There was a place called, we called it the [School?], which was near the Maple Leaf Camp. It was quite a battle that took place for two or three days while we there because we could see that the [Fast Air?] the Turkish [Fast Air?] were coming to try to eliminate the threat that was the School because the School dominated the valley and the access to the airport. The Greek had some 106, some heavy machine gun and must have had [?] for [artillery?] direction. You could see the Fast Air coming in but there didn't seem to be any coordination in the attack. The Fast Air came in, then the [artillery?] then fell, then the tank came and then after that the infantry. So every time the Turk were trying to advance using the sort of tactics it never worked and they were retreating. I suppose we were seen because we were on the top and we were reporting that information to our headquarters. The type of radio that we had wasn't the most secure so I am sure that both sides was listening to our conversations. I was suppose that's what twiggged the Turk to say that we were providing information to the enemy.

As we were not able to patrol on foot we had only soft skin vehicles, jeeps or three quarter tones the colonel requested at least that he be given some capacity to patrol. He was able to get a Ferret car and I was the guy that was designated to go with the crew commander and the driver both [Brit?], excellent soldiers and I was the third guy in the Ferret. We were patrolling and our job was to report what we were seeing. I don't know exactly to what useful aid we were but we were providing the information. We were saying where there was some firefight where the position of the Turks were and the Greeks. There was a couple of times we heard ping on the Ferret because it was providing us protection from small arms. If it would had been heavier maybe I would not be here today but with smalls arms it was not a problem.

One day, I don't remember exactly the date...

INTERVIEWER: 23rd of July?

FORAND: On the 23rd of July I receive an order from Colonel Manuel to go to a place called Kronborg Camp where we had a Company Headquarters with some of our soldiers that were located there. They had a small dispensary, which had received a couple of mortar bombs was on fire and burning down. As the guys were trying to dowse the fire they were being shot at. Colonel Manuel asked me to go there, provide protection in order for them to be able to extinguish the fire. When I arrived the fire had won and there was almost nothing left of the dispensary.

It was a very small camp and in order for me to turn around the Ferret I had to go to the end of that camp which was maybe 300 metres in length. When I arrived at the end in order to make the turn I saw some soldier running around and I asked them what was going? They explained to me the Turk had conducted an attack, which had been repulsed by the Greek. What was left of those Turks had come through the camp to put themselves under protection of the UN. The camp commander was Captain Jean [Vallier?] and Captain Blacquierre who his 2IC explained to them they could not stay in the camp but that--obviously the Turk did not want to get out of the camp because they were afraid for their life. Then Captain Blacquierre volunteered to escort them across-- outside of the camp back to their position.

As they were moving out of the camp into a small river maybe not a river but a small [?] called the Pedhios River even though it's not a river. They were taken and [?] by Greek firing. Six and seven Turk died immediately and Blacquierre was hit and wounded in the leg. He was with a corporal; Corporal Plouffe who provided him security and that had just happened a couple of minutes before I arrived. When I took a look at the situation. I decided to place my Ferret in a position to provide me supporting fire and also asked the soldiers who were there to place a 50 calibre to provide me protection because I had decided to go and get Blacquierre and Plouffe out of there particular position. When these people were in place I went to get Blacquierre and then the Greek opened fire and I gave the order to both the Ferret and the Canadians to open fire. Then I brought back Blacquierre you know to this side give him to the soldier and went back for Plouffe to also take him away from there.

Meanwhile while I was giving my order to place the Ferret and the 50 calibre Plouffe has also been struck by a bullet. Luckily it went through his helmet and then through his jaw and he was not in a very serious condition.

But what I found out 10 years after that event because while I was down there and the bullets were passing over my head I felt secure because the Ferret was firing at 7.62 but it was the sound of the 50 calibre which has a very nice sound you know shooting like hell. and I said well if the Greek they're firing at me they will never be able to pinpoint because of all the firepower going on overhead. Well 10 years later I found out the 50 calibre instead of shooting at the Greek was shooting at the Turks. They were shooting at their own position. [Laughs] My confidence level if I had known that would have been a little bit lower. [Laughs]

INTERVIEWER: It wasn't just those two that were firing from what I've heard a lot of people were opening fire at that point?

FORAND: Yes, me the only one I was hearing though was the 7.62 from the Ferret because they were not very far from where I was in the river. And the BOOM, BOOM, BOOM of the 50 calibre and the other guy with their own particular weapon. But I find out 10 years after talking to the guy who was manning the 50 calibre because he was talking to other people. Well explain to me where you were firing. Instead of firing that

way he was firing that way. He was firing at the Turk position on the other side of the Pethios instead of the Greek position.

INTERVIEWER: Were any of the Greeks firing on [?]

FORAND: Yes, I think two or three were killed. They tried to make a complaint but I think Colonel Manuel told them you fire on my guys, you wound them your bound to get it back and that was the end of it. I never heard anything about that.

INTERVIEWER: You did hear later on that you were awarded the Star of Courage?

FORAND: Yes, when I back in Canada I was very surprised to find out that I was awarded the Star of Courage.

INTERVIEWER: But that was when you were back in Canada sometime later.

FORAND: Yes, yes.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me a little bit about after the first wave, what happened?

FORAND: Well what happened we start to receive some new equipment and the rest of the Airborne Regiment. We were extremely happy to see these guys arrive. These guys were happy to be there even at that time they were a little bit pissed off because they missed all the fun that we had. They didn't know the second phase was coming about. But it was extremely-- we were extremely happy to see these guys arrive. We reorganized First Commando. I was given the B Company to command.

One of the activities that took place during the second phase when the Turkish resumed there advance they were saying the Greek were using the Nicosia Airport for reinforcement and United Nations was saying, "[?] no. We control the airport and the only aircraft that our coming in are for our own purposes."

But the Turk were threatening to attack so I receive an order, at that time it was Colonel Lessard who was commanding the Airborne Regiment, to take my company and to provide security. We receive at that time we had the [artillery airborne?]....

INTERVIEWER: Battery?

FORAND: Battery who had the mortar because that's all we had. The 81 mm mortar but I had my 650 calibre and my 4 106 which I emplaced on the most likely approach. The 50 calibre, the majority of them were on top the airport. We wait for the attack that was supposed to take place the next day at five o'clock. It was a good thing it never happened because we did not have much as far as firepower. I suppose the higher headquarter was able to ensure that no attack took place but we would have had to do our best with what

we had. We knew if it came push to shove we would have given our utmost to ensure that if they had taken the airport they would have paid a price.

INTERVIEWER: You were facing off at that point against M47s or Turkish...

FORAND: M48s, tanks, [artillery?]. They could have used fighters, fighter... the whole shebang they were using. Thank God they didn't come. I think we would have performed well but we were not in a position to with stand for a long period of time with the capacity, little capacity that we had.

INTERVIEWER: When you were at the airport for the second wave did you see-- there was another attack on the [Grammar School?] that was successful, wasn't there?

FORAND: No, they were never able to take the [Grammar School?]. I mean the [Grammar School?] look like it had gone through Second World War but these guys were able to hold throughout. The Turks were never able to take it.

INTERVIEWER: When did you go back to Kronborg as Company Commander?

FORAND: It was not to long after the second phase was completed and we reorganized because what happened during the first phase when the Turkish invasion took place there was a couple of contingents that disappeared. We had to extend our area of responsibility, which went beyond Nicosia. After the second phase these contingents came back so we were to reduce our area of operation. There was a bit of bitterness that we saw these guys because there was some firing they went away-- these guys were also pissed off but it was their [government?] who had made that particular decision. Remember in those days the mentality of peacekeeping was that you're there and there is never any fighting because-- two villages have agreed to a ceasefire and would respect your word and your supposed to face the Military that had a code of ethics and all these things. That was no longer the case and it was very different. I think people didn't realize it was no longer peacekeeping but we did not have the capacity to do peacemaking.

It was funny in the sense that we no longer had-- we had a mandate and we no longer had a mandate in reality because the mandate was based on the Line of Separation and in a lot of area the Line of Separation had been broken. What do you do in those days and nobody gave us any clue as to what except we were trying to still carry on as if nothing had happened. That was a bit hard even though in those days we didn't question our self to much because for almost all of us that was our first time seen some bullet passing close to us or mortar [artillery?] falling close to us and everybody want to find out how they are going to react under those situations. I wouldn't say it was fun but it was different. When you realize that yes you are scared but you still can function and you do what you have been trained to do. You're a group of guys that go through certain things that you normally would not so you form a much better [?], team spirit and all that. You know I could ask anything to my guys and nobody ever said no. Everybody was volunteer. For that it was being a true soldier but after a while you start to realize when you see people

that have been killed or maimed, the destruction, how stupid it is. You go through a phase called [?] I suppose.

INTERVIEWER: The Canadians lost two...

FORAND: Two soldiers and we had about I think it was 30 wounded of different nature. Some severely like-- one day when I was at Kronborg we were group of five people and the 60 mm mortar that fell between us and my driver Forand was wounded severely in the end. My sergeant major was wounded in the head. There's another guy that received something on his arm. Me and another corporal we had nothing. It was during that was had a [lieutenant?] having a-- the water system was not functioning was having a shit outside of the Barrack and it was a 60mm mortar that fell maybe five or six feet from him. He received a few of those shrapnel in the tender part of his behind and that was a hell of laugh. Not for him but for us. That guy before he went back to Canada was ribbed quite a lot about that particular aspect.

One time I remember again at Kronborg we had sort of a small Officer Mess there was mortar bomb there was a [?] that fell right on-- it was a huge wooden piece [?] that fell right on it. We were five or six people and it would have gone through maybe a few of us would have kicked the bucket. A few dicey situations that you tend to forget like I said because we went through that it forms a hell of a good spirit.

Then we were told, after all the trouble, we were supposed to go back in October-- there was a parade and I remember the Colonel saying, "Well guys we're staying until December. That's it. Dismissed."

For a couple of days the people said Oh my God because they were changing the equipment and equipment could not arrive in time and all of that. The organization I think was increased. We had to do some other type of training because the training we were doing previously was maybe not the type of training that was required after the invasion.

INTERVIEWER: Did you, apart from the casualties from conflict; did you have anyone with psychological or discipline problems that required the person to be sent home?

FORAND: I had two. One, the day that we were in Ledra Palace that we had to evacuate there was firing all over the place. I was sending guys by two. So if one guy fell the other guy can pick it up. I was the last one to go with a young soldier. I said, "Go!" and he froze because there was-- well they were passing over us and maybe beside and I had to kick in twice in the ass to make him move because he froze. I think he became more afraid of my kick in the ass anyway we made it on the other side. I decided to keep him in the platoon. I told everybody that I don't want nobody to piss that guy. It could have happened to anybody. I told him you are going to stay with us. Well it took about a month and a month after because we kept him and he did his job. I was asking for a volunteer to go into a patrol that could have been dicey. He put up on hand and went on patrol. That guy even though he had frozen stayed with us.

The other incident was I had the master corporal who was a bully that used to kick the shit out of my young guys and were afraid of him. That guy was in charge of one of my 106 and I was doing my patrol during the night I could see the guy shaking and he asked me to be removed because he was afraid. And I said you-- I used words that weren't very nice [?]. "Me I'm on top of the building if you move from here [I'm going to see you?] and I'm going to kill you." I said, " You kick-- you're always [pounds fists together] fighting with my young guys and all that you better stay in place."

Obviously her stayed there because I think he knew I would have shot him. Maybe not to kill him but I would have shot the bastard.

A month after all the trouble was finished that guy started to do his things but the word passed around because when I spoke to him there was the three other guys of his group and word passed around that he was a [?]. I had guy who that was 5'6" and that guy was about 6'2" and 200 and 5'6" was about 140 pounds. He kicked the shit out of that guy. When that guy came back to Canada he left the Force because he was finished. After that everybody wanted to fight him. That was the only two incidents. The rest like I said before I had some problem with my guys but when it started never, never, never. I mean I was a -- That's why I'm a little bit sound like in Croatia also. I commanded Sector South when the Croats took and there was only one incident where I had a guy who was my cook because there was seven civilians that had been killed by a bomb just outside the camp that I had asked them to go pick up the bodies and that guy just flipped and that's the only one I saw.

I always astounded by the number they throw at us now 22,23,24 percent. I'm not saying that it doesn't happen because not everybody is made the same but I find that hard to believe I could go to six or seven percent maybe but 22 or 23 I don't know. I'm not in the position to judge but I can see that let's say in those circumstances there was a lot of time somebody could have flipped and I didn't see it. Maybe because we were so close together. In Croatia I believe that in certain time in Croatia it was a difficult as the guys have it in Afghanistan these days. I may be wrong but I didn't see the number, the percentage, that we have presently. I don't know. Is it an industry that we are fabricating? We create those psychologist and psychiatrists. We seem to create an industry we-- after the trouble in Croatia they sent me four people from Ottawa and I had to throw them out of my headquarters because they were trying to convince from my point of view, people that they had a problem. I said, "We don't have a problem." The artillery fell, there was some shooting but so what. We're Military. That's part of the job."

INTERVIEWER: Civilian life is not the same as Military life.

FORAND: Well some of them were Military but it was a new organization that was in 95. It was sprucing up and I don't know if they wanted to-- I don't know I-- maybe I'm old fashioned but I don't know.

INTERVIEWER: End of tape one, side one.

END OF SIDE ONE

INTERVIEWER: Canadian War Museum Oral History Project. Interview with Alain Forand on the 15th of February. Tape one, side two.

For the second part of our interview today we would like to focus on your role in the Ice Storm in 1998. This is the 10th year anniversary of the Ice Storm and we would like you to share with us your experiences.

FORAND: I was the Area Sector Commander in Quebec. The Ice Storm for us began on the fifth of January. Where the slight rain begin. Initially there was no problem but on the morning of the sixth-- it carried all night, carried into the morning of the sixth and my area of responsibilities of Quebec and I had some people in what is called Montérégie were was already some problem that were happening where people could not make it to work because of the icy condition of the road. There was in certain areas certain shortage of electricity already.

We alerted the Sécurité Publique. Sécurité Publique was an organization is responsible for emergency response but when there is no problem emergency response always receive the last consideration. They had just went through the throes of reorganization where they had downsized the numbers of people responsible for emergency response. They were located in Quebec City. Quebec City it was raining and not snowing. Normal winter condition and they only one individual that was in Montreal. Even though I alerted them you know of the possibility some problem may arise. They said, “No, no problem. Don’t worry.”

But on the sixth we had already received form the Red Cross a request for 500 [cups?]. You could that potentially there was something.

The rain continued during the night of the sixth and seventh and on the seventh I tasked two of my officers to be sent as liaison officers to the Sécurité Publique in Quebec. When they arrived there they were turned away, they said we don’t need you. There is no problem. I also received a request an additional 500 [cups?] for the Red Cross. When I was looking at the situation and based on the [?] of the weather I was imagining there would be some major problem if it carried on. There was more and more places without electricity. I had more and more of my soldiers receiving-- I was receiving on formation from a solider outside of Montreal that they could not get to work because of the condition and the problem it seems to create in their area. All of that information we were passing to Sécurité Publique who said, “No, no, no, no problem.”

I decided at that time to lower the readiness on what we call our Immediate Reaction Unit, which were located in Valcartier. That where the whole brigade of about 4500 people, the majority of the regular in the Province of Quebec are located and were under

my direct command. The rest of the organization our 27 Militia Unit numbering about again 4500 when they all report. The other organization that were there did not belong to me. The group in St. Jean belongs to ADMPer. There has been a logistic unit in Montreal that belonged to the ADM Material and Bagotville obviously did not belong to me.

So I lowered the readiness of the IRU I cut it by half the reaction time and I also spoke to the brigade commander who was Brigadier General Christian Couture to put the brigade at eight hours notice to move. That was on the eighth sometime after dinner. The rain continued the night of-- sorry that was the seventh. The night of the seventh and the eighth. The eighth I again told the brigade to send two liaison officers to Sécurité Publique to stay there even if they were told they were not needed because the situation was getting worse. There was a lot of power going out and the information I was receiving from my people in the field it was getting bad. I decided to lower again the readiness of the brigade.

On the-- was it the eighth? Could you stop it a minute? [Tape pauses] The [eighth?] morning I receive a request from Sécurité Publique after I had sent my two liaison officers to provide I think it was a request for a 100 people to go to Ste-Jacinte potentially to help Hydro Quebec. I said in my mind 100 is not sufficient so I decided to send our whole IRU plus a troop of Engineers because the task that I had envisioned over those people was to clear the street of any obstacle in order to allow the police, the medical, the ambulance, the firemen, to get through, to remove any obstacle that could be life threatening. So these guys left almost immediately because we were on one-hour notice to move the whole organization and they arrive in Ste-Jacinte and I think they were in place 1300 hours and started work immediately.

I lowered to two hours the readiness of the brigade to be ready to move into the Montreal area. When I did that soon as the IRU was arriving in Ste-Jacinte I decided to move the whole brigade to Montreal because again the information I was receiving was huge area had no power. There was a lot of obstacle impeding traffic and could have been life threatening. There rain was continuing. I said the worst that could happen is that I moved the brigade for nothing so they would be pissed off at the general but if I did right I we would be well placed to start to do what needed to be done.

The brigade started their move in the afternoon and they were all in place in Montreal area by three o'clock in the morning of the ninth. I also decided at that time to send about 200 of them on the South Shore in order to get an evaluation if the situation. When they arrived in Montreal we divided Montreal into brigade, the brigade area. We divided into sector per unit. Their responsibility was to contact the local authority because in those days it was Montreal and 29 other cities that was comprising the Municipality then of Montreal. So they made contact with the locals and start to identify the type of work or task that could be achieved. At that time also were extensively communicating through the Sécurité Publique because I was telling them we work for you guys but this is what we are doing presently. There was still no official request at that time.

On the morning of the ninth I phoned the deputy chief of defence staff and he asked me because I was keeping him and the CDS through him current about situation and what I was doing. He asked me if I needed any help and I said I need all the help I can. So he decided to-- because one of the problem I was confronted in area headquarters it was located in those days in the middle of Montreal near the old Farnham. It was nice place but I did not have a 24/7 capability, not enough staff. I did not have no communications mean through radio. Everything was done through telephone. Telephone in a lot of area were not functioning. So I said yes I don't not have sufficient soldier because the situation in Montreal and Montérégie that's a huge area to be able to cover. Its more than 250 kilometre square. The Montérégie had about 350 towns in the whole bloody area. So I said I need communication capability. So he decided to send the [6th?] Regiment that was in-- situated in Kingston and in Kingston they had the same problem as us. They also had the Ice Storm. These guys were [obliged?] to leave their families behind that were in the same situation that they were coming to help. So that takes a lot of discipline and courage to be able to have done that.

I also asked for additional soldier so he said, "OK I'm going to send you whatever is available from 1st Brigade, which was [?]."

So he tasked 2RCR and 4 Field Squadron in New Brunswick to come and help us. I also ask him the authority to recall the Militia as Class C. Because as Class C if they would have been wounded or what have you they were protected. And that's the main reason and he said yes. I had expected 400 of these Militia and 2000 came. I was extremely well pleased and surprised and they did a hell of a job.

General Leslie, who is commander of the Army presently, was the brigade commander of 1 CMBG. He was told on the ninth afternoon. He arrived at ten, on the tenth at around noon the next day with is recce group. That's very quick. I told him I am going to divide because most of the electricity on the tenth had came back on the Island of Montreal. I had decided to move the majority, the great majority of the soldier on to the South Shore in the Montérégie [?] the [Police Montreal and CUM Montreal?] were not to happy about that but there nothing here now. The electricity is back we have to concentrate where the majority of the problem was. I divided the area of responsibility between [?] and 1CMBG according to the Line of Separation what they we call the MUC. It's the [?] It was easy for the discussion with the local authority to do that.

I also formed a huge Militia unit of about 950 people. Placed them under the direction of General Leslie but send them into the Farnham area and it was the great majority was a few regulars there and I gave the responsibility to an Ex Regular who was a CU of a Militia Unit. They did a fantastic job and it was a great booster for them to be given that particular responsibility.

So General Leslie arrived on the tenth. The 2RCR with his advanced recce group. 2RCR 4 Field Squadron left on the tenth in the morning at five o'clock from Gagetown through a snow storm all the way and they were no accidents and they arrive in location in the

Chambly area two o'clock on the morning of the 11th. General Leslie troops started to arrive on the 11th. That was we did not have C17 but [there was more problem?] with aircraft. They didn't bring a lot of major equipment but they were-- NDHQ did a fantastic job in renting [area flat?], [?] these type of things. Everybody did a fantastic job.

I also had requested the CDS to put under command all the units from the other organization that were in Quebec area. Like the ADMPer unit which is all the language school, the training school in St. Jean, the recruiting school, the recruit school and the ADMMat unit under my command. I regroup all the ADMMat unit under the command of the 25th Depot. It was Colonel Pierre [Cadet?] and these guys did a fantastic job. Everybody did a super, super job. So all of that was taking place on the 11th.

I also-- because my headquarter in Montreal was so small I could not reorganize myself I still had-- we were in the throes of selling the old FMC headquarters in St. Hubert and I was able to reoccupy the building that used to be the FMC Headquarters. This is where we installed ours self and when on the 11th the [6th Regiment?] were arriving I had also asked some staff from the [HQ division?] that headquarters that existed in those days in Kingston. We organize our headquarters in St. Hubert. All that took place on the 11th.

The majority of the troops from 1CMBG started to arrive on the 11th and everything was completed by the 12th. [Cinquieme Brigade?] was already in location on the South Shore and from the 12th to the 19th or the 20th I would say no the 21st that was where the major part of the work took place. The guys were working 17 hours a day. That was when the worst of the conditions because the weather was around minus 25, minus 30 during the day with a lot of wind. There's not to many trees in those areas and it's all wind swept and the guys-- the majority of the work was to support Hydro Quebec but also had the responsibility to establish a shelter centre.

To provide our capacity for planning I had about 25 liaison officers that I sent to help Sécurité Publique who finally moved to Montreal, to help them in the planning because that's a one of our strengths. Hydro Quebec it was the same thing. There were seven officers that were sent there. Our main tasks aside from helping Hydro Quebec was to remove all the major obstacles. Overall in man-days we provided a 138 000 man days. The Director General of Hydro Quebec [?] he told me the work that the Military had done had helped in reestablishing the network by about a month.

INTERVIEWER: One month earlier?

FORAND: Yes,

INTERVIEWER: This was all between the 12th and 21st?

FORAND: Well yes because after that we start to reduce and this is the hardest. Once you are involved to start to do the withdrawal phase but I came to an agreement with Premier Bouchard that I would leave Military in position 24 hours after the electricity had been

reestablished. Then we would move troops. So the first people I sent back obviously was 1CMBG, 2RCR, 4 Field Squadron and I started to draw down the Headquarters so I could send back some people from Kingston. The last people that were in location until the sixth of February and at the end was mostly the Militia people that I kept because it was easier for them. They were from the area and lot of these guys there was no school so it was more money in their pocket.

We finally receive, I didn't mention that, the official request from the not the Prime Minister but the Minister of Sécurité Publique not sent to me but sent to his counter part at the federal level 36 hours after we had been in Montreal. The official request. So I think it was the preventive that we did-- it was fantastic because we were feeling the fact that when the Military arrive in place it seems to boost up the confidence of the population. It was like people telling us the Military are there the problem will be solved. The Army has never been very popular in Quebec but there was three polls conducted during the Ice Storm and the question was which one is the best organization and the three times we had 95.5, 95.4 and 95 percent the Military and Hydro Quebec was at 81 percent. We had never done that in Quebec. This is what I think of the of the Ice Storm, is how proud I was of the Military. The work that these guys did was really something. The guys were proud because they could see the people appreciate and they were doing it for their own people. That was a-- remember in those days we were supposed to be no leadership we had problems galore. We were able to organize ourselves and do that type of work.

INTERVIEWER: Without guidance from...

FORAND: Without guidance from and to do it the way it's supposed to be done. Remember that we are the only organization that when we arrive were able to immediately begin work because we are autonomous. We bring everything with us. Our kitchen, our doctors, our support people, our communication what have you.

INTERVIEWER: Your medical facilities treated 1000s...

FORAND: This is another success story that has not been to me published enough because they inoculate 7000 people. I do not know if you know the system of inoculation it's an administrative burden and a nightmare and 7000 people in the span of one week and a half I think is fantastic. Not only that there was a threat of a spread of an epidemic but there was no epidemic because of the quick reaction of those people. The civilian I think would not believe their eyes the way they were organized and the amount of work they were willing to put in the-- were not [?] you know. Was the same for the Hydro people, they could not believe these guys are [?] they had their breaks and their lunch hour and all that and our guys were working their our ass off. That's a...

INTERVIEWER: Did you find after things got rolling that cooperation between the civilian side and the Military side worked out pretty well?

FORAND: We had good cooperation because the first week after I was the area commander I had the flood of the Saguenay. So the flood of the Saguenay there was immediate reaction from the commander of CFB Bagotville send helicopter. Usually I'm supposed to be responsible but as soon as we knew about that I say, "OK you're my commander on site until I'm able to send some staff officer."

Then the Immediate Reaction Unit was 12RBC at Quebec and we sent them within 24 hours to Bagotville and they establish a tent city. It was different over there because it's not like the Ice Storm which has a repercussion for a longer period. There the flood, people came into CFB Bagotville. We house them in the tent city but within 24 hour their folks, friends or family come and get them. It was a transition place.

What I found out there because I went their twice, I found out there was no knowledge amongst the first responder of-- they knew their responsibility but the other did not know their responsibility. They were not-- the coordination and cooperation was not very good because they did not seem to know each other. So what I did when I came back I told my staff well if there is any type of crisis there are certain first responders that will always be there. If it's in the Montreal area you are going to have Montreal Police aside from us the Military that could be asked. You'll have the Sécurité Quebec. You have the Red Cross. You could have the Indian Affairs. Sécurité Publique. All kind of organization so I organize meeting with those people. We communicated with them and say, "Come to us and we'll spend the day, invite you for lunch."

We made a presentation. This is the way we work. This is how you should request us. These are things we will do and these are the things we will not do.

Because that's one of the I did not mention I knew that the province would make an official I phoned Premier Bouchard and I said, "We're working for you. You're the boss. You tell us what you do. This is what we'll do and this is what we'll not do."

I had a great relationship with him. I think Bouchard and [?] were the-- it's a good thing they were there because they had great leadership. If there would have been other not as capable it could have been some problem but anyhow. So we had those meeting. So we spent a full day with these guys. They were doing the same. They were telling us this is the way we are organized and we establish a relationship with all those organization. I made the-- we went to [?]. I had an aircraft and Canadian Forces aircraft. In those days it was a little bit easier to get them. I got the majority of these guys on board and we went to [?] and we went to [?]. So we spent-- at times we got to know each other. When the Ice Storm arrived I knew the majority of the people. We had already established the relationship. We were in communication with them. I had cell which was responsible for domestic operation that were maintaining links with their staff but I knew the major players. It was much more easier.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of aid to the civil power did you have a guiding policy statement to bring you through this or was this something you improvised based on what you observed?

FORAND: No it was a new policy from DCDS, which I had started when I was [?] in 95 before coming the area commander. It was replacing the old [? 200], which was The War Measures Act and these type of things. DCDS 298 it was called was the instruction that was covering all the services that we could provide by category and requesting procedure and who the authorizing authority.

INTERVIEWER: So you had to be involved from the ground up with the policy and...

FORAND: We had to follow that and I could not offer things that we not within my [?]. But when there is a possibility if there is a life-threatening situation I don't have to ask permission to anybody. That's the way I reacted but since I was keeping current at NDHQ with everything that was there-- NDHQ was fantastic because the guys who was DCDS was General [?] and I-- we were directing staff together at Kingston. I knew him well. He's a excellent officer and for him it's operation. That's what he did. He provided us everything that we want. He protected us. All kinds of people that want to-- he did a fantastic job as general because the worst thing you want to have is a politician trying to come around because they want to have something special. [? And [?] protected us. You see a Prime Minister Chretien came four times and he was at [?] four time so everything that we did could not go around because the Prime Minister was saying these guys did a fantastic job.

Because remember in those days we had what we called a Stupid Policy that you could not speak to the media before requesting authority from NDHQ. I said this is stupid. I had 12 000 soldier, my best individual, my best representative are these guys so give them the authority to speak to the media because we knew the media would be all over the place. If the guys is not able to speak what do you think would have happened? I said, "You are allowed to speak but you're not the General. You speak about you're area of responsibility. Stick to that and you will see there will be no problem."

Like I said we never had one incident where the media dump on us or had bad publicity to the contrary.

INTERVIEWER: You had 95 percent popularity, right?

FORAND: As I said when Chretien came to the first place and he was very enthusiastic and all that. NDHQ never had a chance to say, request-- it went so well-- like I said I'm paid to make decision but you have to live with the consequence of your decision. When everything goes well there's no problem.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of lessons learned from the event do you...

FORAND: Lessons learned, the first thing you need to establish this contact before and I think now it's in place and I would hope I [?] in Canada but in Quebec it has continued that those types of things. You have to realize the media will be involved. You don't fight the media. You have to be honest with them. Accommodate them. That's a reality...

Emergency response unfortunately it's like a Life Insurance Policy but nobody wants to talk about it but when you need it everybody expects it will be there. The great majority of the town had no emergency response what so ever. Like who's in charge? Is there a place where we will be able to use as shelter. I mean those simple type of things that was not in existence. I think they have improved quite a lot in Quebec. The Sécurité Publique has not very well organized but I think that we can say that for a lot of organization because I think we are [forte?] in the Military is the planning in the organization. When you first deal with [civilian?] organization it's not quite the same way. It's a lesson learned but it's a lesson learned that I think will have to be relearned constantly.

The fact that we had [FMC?] Headquarters now we know longer have it. I'm not sure even with the new headquarter they built at Long Point if they are able to function 24/7 capability. I'm not so sure. I'm not so sure Canada [Come?] is the way to because all you add is another headquarter on top of another headquarter. Headquarter, the majority if them just create work, do not provide solution so that could be something, which could be a problem.

We still don't have the communication capability. It's crucial because you have to make a decisions quickly-- there's a lot of lessons learned that I don't all remember I had put in my report. I'm not so sure that we do the right think in lessons learned. You make a presentation like the one made to the daily executive meeting. When I went there it was only a couple of weeks after but it was like do you're report and get the hell out of here we have much more interesting things to do. I could not understand that attitude because at least in Quebec there was 12 000 Military that were deployed there. The fact that the population was behind the Army and to be treated like, hurry up with your presentation and get the hell out of there. That was a bit disappointing.

INTERVIEWER: It was a great success?

FORAND: It was a success but it's like OK you did your job-- Yes we did our job. That's what we were paid for but I thought that the soldiers did a fantastic job because in those days the [?] I was making at the end-- the majority of my Militia people did not have winter gear. That was criminal. Minus 30 because in those days, it's not like today there was nobody-- winter equipment. If we only had one incident, one car incident in the whole period. Usually when we went to Gagetown we always had a few incident going. To Kingston, the camp accident coming back. One accident, it was not our fault. It was one of our guy that was working under five quarter tone and a 10 tone civilian hit him in the back on the[?] That was the only incident. That guy was really wounded and his life was hanging in the threads but there was, A because it was not declared a Theatre of Operation he could not get any pension until he got out. This is point of [A?]. They did a

study what was it called, Improvement of the Military Lot. Now it took two years because it was my recommendation even if it's a domestic operation it should be classified as a area of operation. Now it is. If there is a domestic operation it becomes an area of operation and if you are wounded and you are allowed to have a pension [?] you get it immediately. You do not have to wait until you get out of the service.

What was the other one? One of the lessons learned is that NDHQ or an headquarter because they [?]. You give direction to people. You give them the resources in accordance to the direction and leave them to do their bloody job. Don't get in their hair. That's what happened with General [?]. I was telling them that's the way it should be otherwise why the hell do you put someone in charge. If everybody would do that I think it would be much more easier.

The other lesson learned I said I mentioned is 24 or 25 liaison officers. This is-- you need that. You need to have somebody that will respond to you and is able to communicate to the people, the civilian organization or what have you this is how we are going to do it. This is why we are doing it and is able to pass you the information and disprove-- It's a requirement.

The fact that I was able to gather all the ADMMat unit under one commander, Pierre [Cadet?] this save our bacon because there was one guy responsible for all of the material. All of the material because the biggest depot that we have in the Canadian Forces is Montreal in Long Point and it's a brand new-- it's a state of the art thing. And these guys-- all the of the equipment whether it was coming from the Canada or the States arrive at Long Point. It was discharge. These guys were sorting it out and depend on the priority put back on trucks and BANG, BANG, BANG and these guys were working 24 hours a day seven days a week. That was a good lesson learned also to regroup everything. All the unit even though they were not under my command was put under my command for that and that's another thing. Then there is no hassle. No I have to ask my boss. Even the helicopter from Valcartier came under my command and I received some additional [?] from Bagotville.

At one point I remember Hydro Quebec it was a line from Montreal to Mont-Jolie. There was a line where-- the only way because it was in the mountain that they could break the ice was throw [log?] on the ice. They had asked us and the [pilot?] said, "Yes, we're willing to do it."

But they had to ask the authority, the Air Command, and Air Command did not want to take that and I said, "I'll take it." So I said it's my responsibility. The guy went...

INTERVIEWER: [?]

FORAND: Yes. The oscillation-- all you need is break a little bit then the oscillation begins and it breaks all the ice. These guys it was the first time. They were afraid if they throw it does not hit at the right place that it could hit the...

FORAND: Hit the rotors.

INTERVIEWER: The rotors. Yes. I said, "How confident are you guys?"

I spoke to the pilot, a young guy. No problem we'll do it. I'm going to assign, go and do it. The guys were very happy to do it. They had no problem.

But do you know what's the greatest fear? It's the fear to be afraid. That's a lot of people, that's what they have. They're afraid to be afraid. So that's the greatest fear in my mind.

So overall like I said I've never been so proud of being in the Military. To see it and you can feel it in people. They were coming to us. Me because now we are so stupid in the Military you have staff car we are not allowed use it. My family was in Ottawa because they did not want to move to Montreal because after 17 moves they said, "No way hose." It was only a two-year job. So I was living at the headquarters in Long Point. I was taking the Metro to go to work because I was in the middle of the Montreal. For a month and a half after the Ice Storm I never paid because I was dressed in Military. Then one day they said, "Where are you going!" So I had to pay [Laughter]

INTERVIEWER: Gratitude only lasts so long.

FORAND: Yes, yes but still a month and a half but one day they said oops finished. [Laughter] It was unfortunate that the 10th year the role of the Military was almost passing under silence but that's the way it goes in this country. You do your job and they quickly forget. A lot of other people were put in the highlight but the Military but... that's the way it goes.

INTERVIEWER: Luckily we have it on record.

FORAND: Yes, well we know what we did so I don't think we can ask for more than that.

INTERVIEWER: Canadian War Museum Oral History Program interview with Alain Forand, 15th February 2008, interview ends.

TRANSCRIPT ENDS

